Why the 45-Day Ceasefire Proposal Falls Short of Delivering Peace for Iran

On the 37th day of the aggression by the United States and the Zionist regime against Iran, some media outlets, such as Axios, have raised the proposal of a 45-day ceasefire. According to these media outlets' claims, regional mediators are exploring a possible 45-day ceasefire as part of a two-stage agreement that could lead to a permanent end to the war.

An informed source told Reuters that the commander of the Pakistani army "has been in touch all night long" with JD Vance, the Vice President of the United States, Steve Witkoff, the special envoy, and Abbas Araghchi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran.

The media has claimed that these efforts, with Pakistan's mediation, could be introduced as a step toward reducing tensions and even ending the war. But upon examining this proposal and the nature of the actors aggressing against Iran, we are faced with an incomplete, one-sided, and ultimately useless plan for Iran.

Historical experience, field realities, and even the prevailing rhetoric of this proposal all indicate that this ceasefire is not so much a way to resolve the crisis as it is an opportunity to reproduce it in the near future.

The first point that is clearly evident in this plan is the lack of any balance in the commitments of the parties. While talk of Iran's possible commitments has been raised, practically no specific or binding reference to the duties and actions of the American side is seen.

This issue reflects a deep-rooted perspective in American policymaking, which defines negotiation not as a two-way process, but rather as a tool for dictating its own demands. In such a framework, agreement is the product of pressure and imposition.

This is while the reality of the battlefield presents a different picture. Contrary to the initial assumption of the architects of this conflict, not only has Iran's operational structure not collapsed, but in many areas, it has been able to maintain the balance and even impose its will on the opposing side in some cases.

It is this gap between "the perception in think tanks" and "the reality on the ground" that causes proposals of this kind to be based on a weak foundation from the start. When one side still sees itself in a superior position and the opposing side in a position of accepting terms, it is natural that the output of such a perspective will be an unbalanced and unstable agreement.

The more important issue is the historical experience in facing ceasefires of this kind. In the political and social memory of not only the Iranian people but also the people in the countries of the region, a ceasefire with the United States and the Zionist regime is defined not as an end to the conflict but as entering a gray state of "neither war, nor peace"; a situation in which the opposing side finds the opportunity to rebuild itself and, at an appropriate time, initiate a new round of pressure or even attack. This pattern is the result of frequent observations in the region.

A clear example of this issue can be observed in the developments in Gaza. In recent years, ceasefires mediated by various actors, including the United States, have been announced repeatedly, but either these ceasefires were violated midway or the opposing side did not fulfill its commitments.

In many cases, the ceasefire merely became an opportunity for reorganizing forces, completing logistical chains, and preparing for the next stage of the conflict. Naturally, in such circumstances, trusting the effectiveness of a temporary ceasefire, especially without objective guarantees, is difficult.

Here we face the key point: "guarantees." Any ceasefire can be meaningful only if it has a practical and verifiable backing. The mere signing of a memorandum of understanding or an unstable agreement cannot substitute for real guarantees.

From this perspective, accepting a temporary 45-day ceasefire, especially in a situation where no enforceable guarantees yet exist, could be considered a strategic mistake. Because this ceasefire, rather than helping to consolidate achievements, provides the possibility of eroding them. During this period, the opposing side can easily rebuild its military capability, repair damaged infrastructure, and even revise its strategies.

Furthermore, one should not overlook the regional dimensions of this 45-day ceasefire window. One probable scenario is America's attempt to use this pause to expand the scope of the conflict. Experience has shown that Washington, in situations where it is not able to advance its goals alone, seeks to build coalitions. Within this framework, the ceasefire could become an opportunity to apply political and security pressure on certain Arab countries in the region, to somehow bring them into direct confrontation with Iran.

On the other hand, the issue of the Strait of Hormuz also holds particular importance in this regard. This strategic passageway is considered one of Iran's most important leverage points in regional and global equations. Any agreement that leads to the reopening of this strait without receiving balanced concessions and credible guarantees for a permanent end to the war would effectively mean a serious weakening of one of Iran's winning cards.

In such circumstances, the ceasefire could turn into an opportunity for the opposing side to change the conditions of passage through this strait in its favor, using various tools, including diplomatic and military pressure, and gradually render this leverage ineffective.

Another important point is the temporal nature of this ceasefire. 45 days might initially seem like a limited period, but in military and security logic, this duration can be very decisive. During this period, not only is reconstruction and replenishment of forces possible, but the opportunity to design and execute more complex scenarios is also provided. In other words, this ceasefire could become an "operational pause" for the opposing side, without necessarily creating any change in its overarching goals.

In contrast, what would Iran gain in such a situation? If it is merely a matter of a temporary reduction in hostilities, without any guarantee against a return to the previous conditions, practically no tangible achievement will be realized. This pause might even lead to a reduction of pressure on the opposing side and an increase in political and media pressure on Iran, because in the post-ceasefire atmosphere, expectations for further concessions from Iran will increase.

Ultimately, it must be said that the main issue is not opposition to the principle of negotiation or even a ceasefire; rather, the debate is over the conditions and framework. A ceasefire in which the balance of commitments is not observed, objective guarantees do not exist, previous experiences have been violated, and the potential for the opposing side to exploit it is high, cannot be in Iran's interests. Such a proposal, rather than helping to resolve the crisis, carries the risk of reproducing it in a more complex form.

Accordingly, any decision regarding the acceptance or rejection of this ceasefire must be made by taking all these considerations into account. Experience has shown that in equations of this sort, haste can be costly. What matters is maintaining the initiative, relying on the realities of the battlefield, and avoiding being trapped in frameworks that others have designed. Otherwise, a ceasefire that is introduced today as an opportunity may turn into a greater threat tomorrow.